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Abstract. A lot of decisions are made during boardroom meetings. Af-
ter a discussion, the head of the board often asks for a quick poll. But
what if you cannot join the meeting? So called boardroom voting schemes
have been proposed to conduct the poll over the Internet and thereby
enabling also those who are not present but available online to partici-
pant in the poll. But what if you are not available at this point in time?
For important decisions you may want to delegate your vote to a present
and trusted board member. In this paper, we show how to extend an
existing boardroom voting scheme towards delegation functionality. The
new scheme is evaluated against security requirements determined for
boardroom voting and security requirements tailored to the delegation
process.
1 Introduction
Boardroom voting schemes are one of the new research directions in electronic
voting and a number of approaches have been proposed [2,12–14,16,20,27]. Some
of these approaches provide the possibility to participate in the polls remotely.
However, time and geographical restrictions often prevent absent board members
from participating in the poll. Consequently, decisions are often not supported
by a required quorum. For such situation, it is worth considering the possibility
to delegate ones’ vote to a trusted board member that is present, the so-called
proxy.
We extend the boardroom voting approach described in [20] to enable dele-
gation. To do so we introduce so so-called delegation token, that is sent by the
voter who wants to delegate. The rest of the board members get a random value
that is indistinguishable from the authorised delegation token. The authorised
delegation token is also distributed via secret sharing among all the of board
members. In this way, during the voting the board members can validate the
votes cast with an authorised delegation token, without revealing the identity of
the board member who received the authorised delegation token, and thus was
trusted by the voter to cast a delegated ballot on her behalf.
Note that an alternative solution would be to let the voters jointly establish
a a public-key encryption system used in the election before the election, so that
the delegating voters could use it to encrypt their delegation tokens, and the
majority of present voters could use the corresponding private key in order to
decrypt the data sent within an election. However, our delegated voting scenario
assumes, that all the setup that is required for a specific election occurs within
the meeting, since it is not always practical to demand that the present board
members gather together in advance to conduct election setup before each elec-
tion.Hence, the way for the absent voters to delegate to a trusted board member
of her choice prior to the election is needed, which is achieved by our proposal.
Therefore,
The paper is structured as follows. We describe the requirements on delegated
voting found in the literature in Section 2 and the background for our scheme in
Section 3. We describe our solution for delegating in boardroom voting setting
in Section 4, followed by the security evaluation in Section 5. We describe the
related work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Security Requirements
For the security requirements that are related to direct voting as opposed to
delegating, we rely on the list of security requirements for boardroom voting
given in [20]3.
Voter eligibility. Only the votes from eligible voters, and only one vote from
each voter, should be included in the result.
Vote integrity. Each cast vote (direct or delegated) of an eligible voter should
be correctly included in the tally.
Robustness. After the vote casting has finished, the election result can be com-
puted even in case where some of the scheme components are faulty.
Vote privacy. The voting scheme should not provide any more information that
enables establishing a link between the honest voter4 and her vote (delegated
or direct) aside from the information that would be output by the ideal proxy
boardroom voting scheme.
Fairness. The voting scheme should not reveal partial election results before all
the votes have been cast.
The security requirements on the delegation process are based on the avail-
able literature concerning delegated voting [18,19,30]. Note we provide informal
definitions for these requirements, since no formalization of the requirements on
delegation process either in form of legal or technical definitions exist.
3 As opposed to [20], similar to the proposal in [5] we consider verifiability to be a part
of integrity, and not a separate requirement. We furthermore consider uniqueness a
part of eligibility
4 We refer to a voter or a proxy as honest if she behaves according to the scheme
specification.
Delegation eligibility. Only the delegated ballots on behalf of eligible voters, and
only one delegated ballot per voter, should be included in the tally.
Delegation integrity. No proxy can vote on the voter’s behalf unless authorised
by the voter.
Delegation privacy. The voting scheme should not provide any information to
the public or to the proxies themselves, that identifies whether a particular voter
has delegated to a particular proxy.5. We further require that the voter should
not be able to use her private data from the election to construct the proof for
delegating to a specific proxy herself by divulging this data to an adversary.
Delegation power privacy. The voting scheme should not reveal, how many
voters have delegated to a specific proxy.
3 Background
In this section we describe the background required for our scheme.
3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
The public-key ElGamal cryptosystem [11] is used in our scheme for encrypting
the cast votes and other data that is exchanged during the election.
In order to prove the validity of statements in our scheme without revealing
any information beyond that, zero-knowledge proofs are used. Namely, we will use
the methods described in [6] in order to construct the zero-knowledge proofs of
statements about discrete logairthms. In this, we use the following notation in our
paper: for example, given the public values g, h, y1, y2, the notation PoK{x1, x2 :
y1 = g
x1 ∧ y2 = gx2hx1} denotes the proof of knowledge of secret values x1, x2
so that y1 = g
x1 and y2 = g
x2hx1 holds.
The non-interactive version for zero-knowledge proofs is computed using the
strong Fiat-Shamir heuristic as described in [4] with H as a cryptographic hash
function.
For the delegation process, our scheme relies on distribution of secret delega-
tion tokens among multiple voters, which is done using threshold secret sharing.
This secret can then be reconstructed only if at least the threshold of all the
voters collaborates. A number of proposals have been made for this purpose,
with our scheme relying on a proposal in [26]6.
5 Note, that the relevancy of this requirement might be debated, since in some cases it
is reasonable to assume, that other boardroom members know whom the delegating
voter trusts anyway. Still, we choose to include this requirement for the case, when
the voter does not wish to publicly disclose his support for a particular proxy to
others, or even to the proxy herself.
6 While there are extensions of [26] that ensure verifiability to protect against dishonest
dealers (e.g. [24]), this protection is not required in our scheme, since the dealer has
no incentive to cheat during secret sharing. Hence, for the sake of simplicity we chose
to use a less complex variant.
Another application of threshold secret sharing techniques in our scheme is
the distributed generation of a public ElGamal key used for encryption within
the election, and a set of private key shares distributed among the voters. The
distributed key generation occurs as described in [23]. The threshold t is being
chosen so that the collaboration of at least t voters is required to reconstruct
the secret key or decrypt a ciphertext. The secret key shares are then used to
distributively decrypt the encrypted data by applying the scheme as described
in [23]. A zero-knowledge proof is used to prove the decryption validity.
In order to commit to a value without revealing it, in our scheme we use
Pedersen commitments [24], that are unconditionally hiding and computation-
ally binding under the assumption that the discrete logarithm is hard in the
chosen group.
In order to anonymize a list of ElGamal ciphertexts by removing the link
between each ciphertext and its sender, a re-encryption mix net scheme is being
applied. The mix net consists of several mix nodes, in which each mix node
shuffles the ciphertexts in turn, and provides the output as an input to the
next mix node. It holds that the ciphertexts are anonymized, as long as at least
one mix node does not reveal its secret values used for shuffling. For the sake
of preventing manipulation (i.e. that no ciphertexts have been replaced during
the shuffling), various methods for proving the validity of the shuffle have been
proposed, such as [3, 29].
In order to check, whether two ElGamal ciphertexts e1, e2 encrypt the same
value, without revealing any other information about corresponding plaintexts,
we use the technique described in [15], the plaintext equivalence test (PET),
denoted as PET(e1, e2). This test is distributively performed by the participants
who hold the shares of a secret decryption key and outputs 1 in case e1 and e2
encrypt the same plaintext, or a random value otherwise.
3.2 Boardroom Voting Scheme from [20]
We briefly describe the boardroom voting scheme proposed in [20] and used as
a basis for our proxy boardroom voting extension. The scheme in [20] is based
upon the proposal in [8] and adjusted towards decentralized setting, where the
voters take over the role of the trustees. The election runs as follows.
Setup. Prior to the election, the voters exchange their public signing keys in
order to enable authenticated message exchange. For this purpose they conduct
the decentralized key exchange as described in [22], so that the correctness of
the exchanged keys is established by manual verification of the so-called short
authentication strings via an out-of-band channel (e.g. phone conference or phys-
ical proximity). After exchanging the signing keys, each pair of voters runs the
Diffie-Hellman key [10] exchange in order to establish the symmetric secret keys
for private communication. After the public signing keys and the symmetric se-
cret keys have been established, the voters run the distributed threshold secret
sharing as described in [23] in order to generate a public election key pk and
share the corresponding private election key sk.
Voting. Once the election key has been generated, one voter takes over the role
of the election organizer and initilizes the voting. In order to vote, each voter
encrypts her chosen voting option with the public election key pk and broadcasts
it as her ballot to other voters.
Tallying. Once all the ballots have been cast, the voter jointly perform the
tallying. For this, they shuffle the ballots with a verifiable re-encryption mix
net [29], where each voter acts as a mix node. After the shuffling, the voters
jointly run the distributed threshold decryption as described in [23] in order to
reveal the election result.
4 Our Scheme
We are now ready to provide a description of our scheme for proxy voting in
boardroom voting setting. We assume the existence of a trustworthy public-key
infrastructure among all eligible voters, established either via decentralized key
exchange as in [20] or in any other appropriate way7. Furthermore, the PKI
is used to establish private communication channels between the voters, and a
reliable broadcast channel for present voters is established (e.g. via Byzantine
agreement [21]). For the sake of simplicity, we describe the tallying with the
anonymization performed via mix net shuffle. However, the scheme can be easily
modified for supporting homomorphic tallying.
In further descriptions we imply that every message is signed by its sender idi
with a private signing key skidi . In order to prevent the reuse of old signatures,
the signature should furthermore incorporate timestamps and/or other specific
information about the election.
4.1 Pre-Election
A list of all the eligible voters id1, ..., idN is made available
8, with a list of
their public signing keys pkidi (the corresponding private signing keys skidi are
possessed only by the voters). Furthermore, each voter broadcasts a pair of keys
(gi, hi) with xi = loggi hi known only to the voter idi. The list of voters that are
about to be present at the meeting is known in advance, so that the majority of
them are actually present.
4.2 Delegation
The delegation can occur before as well as during the election, prior to the
voting. We define Vd ⊂ {id1, ..., idN} as a set of voters who delegate, and Vp =
7 Note that as this PKI can used independently of any specific election, it can be
prepared well in advance and reused subsequently.
8 This list, for example, could be a list of board members who have a right to partic-
ipate in the meeting.
{id1, ..., idN}\Vd as the voters who decide to vote directly (referred to as present
voters, or as proxies).
The threshold t is defined as bNp/2c + 1, with Np = |Vp| as the number
of present voters. If a voter idi ∈ Vd decides to delegate, following steps are
required:
The voter idi selects a random value mi ∈ Zq, which serves as her delegation
token. She then shares gmii among present voters as follows:
– Compute the shares of m using Shamirs secret share scheme: select a random
polynomial fi(x) ∈ Zq[x] with degree t − 1 and fi(0) = mi. For each voter
idj ∈ Vp, compute secret share mi,j = fi(j).















i for random ri,j , ui,j ∈ Zq, and a digital
signature on ci,j , si,j = Sign(skidi , ci,j).
– For each voter idj ∈ Vp, set m′i,j to mi if the voter idj is chosen as a proxy,
and a random value in Zq otherwise. If the voter does not want to choose a






i,j , si,j , ri,j , ui,j) is being sent to each voter idj ∈ Vp over






At this point, any voter idi who delegated her voting right can change her mind
and attend the meeting; in that case, idi is excluded from Vd and added to Vp
prior to voting.
During the election, the distributed threshold secret sharing is being executed
by the present voters idj ∈ Vp to establish the public election key pkv = (gv, hv)
and the corresponding private election key skv with hv = g
skv
v . At this point the
list of valid voting options is being made available, as V = {v1, ..., vL} ⊂ ZLq .
Furthermore, for all the delegating voters idi ∈ Vd an encryption of the
delegation token mi with pkv is jointly calculated, whereby each voter idj ∈ Vp




i,j , ci,j , ri,j , ui,j) as received
during the delegation:
– Encrypt her share of gmii resulting in e
(d)
i,j = Enc(pkv, g
mi,j
i ),
– Compute the proof of knowledge χi,j , which is constructed using the tech-
nique in [7] and proves that e
(d)
i,j encrypts the same value that is committed




i,j ) (i.e. χi,j = PoK{ri,j , ui,j , r′i,j : ai,j = g
r′i,j











i } for e
(d)
i,j = (ai,j , bi,j)).
– Broadcast the tuple (idi, e
(d)
i,j , ci,j , χi,j).
Given that for each i, at least t of the values of e
(d)
i,j with valid proofs, j ∈














j−k . The resulting value of e
(d)
i thus corresponds to




i with the public signing key pkv.
4.4 Voting
The voters who are present in the meeting (i. e. idj ∈ Vp) cast their ballots
directly by submitting E
(p)
j = Enc(pkv, vj) with vj signifying their choice, and
the accompanying well-formedness proof σj that proves the knowledge of vj and,
in case of anonymization via homomorphic tallying, that vj ∈ V. Furthermore,
for each delegating voter idi ∈ Vd, each present voter idj ∈ Vp calculates a value
ê
(d)
i,j = Enc(pkv, g
m′i,j
i ). Note that ê
(d)
i,j encrypts mi only in case that the voter
idj is in possession of a token mi (i.e. m
′
i,j = mi). For the sake of ensuring
soundness, the voter further calculates πi,j as a proof of knowledge of plaintext
discrete logarithm for m′i,j constructed using the technique described in [7] (i.e.















i,j as Enc(pkv, v
(d)
i,j ) with v
(d)
i,j as her chosen option to cast on behalf
of the delegating voter idi, σi,j as the proof of plaintext knowledge for E
(d)
i,j , and




i,j , πi,j , σi,j).
4.5 Tallying - Weeding Duplicates and Invalid Delegations
In the next stage, the delegated ballots are jointly processed by the present
voters. First, the delegated ballots with invalid proofs of knowledge πi,j , σi,j
are removed. Then, the vote updating policy is applied. Namely, the given two
ballots cast as direct ballots by the same voter, or two delegated ballots cast
on behalf of the same voter by the same proxy, either all but the last (if vote
updating is allowed) or all by the first (if vote updating is not allowed) cast
ballot are excluded from further processing.
The next step removes the delegated ballots if they have canceled by the





i,j , πi,j), the ballots with idi ∈ Vp are removed.
The remaining delegated ballots are being anonymized via verifiable re-
encryption mix net with each present voter acting as a mix node, resulting in




i,j )}idi∈Vd,idj∈Vp . The values e
(d)
i that encrypt
the voters delegation tokens mi are also processed through the mix net resulting
in an anonymized list V ′ = {e′(d)i }idi∈Vd . The next step removes the delegated
ballots cast with an invalid delegation token. For this, the following procedure









i ) for each e
′(d)
i ∈ V ′.
– If the PET is positive for some e′
(d)
i , add E
′(d)
i,j to the list V
′′ for further




4.6 Tallying - Mixing and Decrypting
After that, the list of ciphertexts {E(p)j }idj∈Vp∪{E′
(d)
i } ∈ V ′′ is being anonymized
with another mix net shuffle. The anonymized result is being decrypted via dis-
tributed decryption.
5 Security
We now conduct an informal security evaluation of the proposed scheme. Namely,
we argue that the security requirements outlined in Section 2 are fulfilled under
the following assumptions9:
(A1) Out of Np present voters, at least Np− t+1 are honest and do not divulge
their private information to the adversary.
(A2) The devices of honest voters are trustworthy.
(A3) At least t of present voters are available, capable to communicate with
each other, and produce valid output during the election.
(A4) The PKI is trustworthy.
(A5) The adversary is computationally restricted, the decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard in the selected group, and the signature scheme used in the
PKI is reliable. The random oracle is instantiated by the hash function H.
(A6) No coercion takes place.
We start off with evaluating the security requirement related to direct voting.
Voter eligibility. This requirement is ensured as long as the PKI used to authen-
ticate the voters is trustworthy (A4). Furthermore, the duplicate votes submitted
by voters are removed throughout the tallying phase. Unless the PKI is not trust-
worthy (A4), dishonest voters cannot cast multiple votes. If a voter delegates her
right to vote and additionally casts a vote personally, then the voter’s delegation
is invalidated throughout the tallying phase if the PKI is trustworthy (A4).
Vote integrity. For direct votes, this requirement can be violated by replacing a
cast vote with another ciphertext at the time of vote casting. Alternatively, the
adversary could drop the messages with cast votes from particular voters at vote
casting, thus excluding these votes from the tally. However, given a trustworthy
voting device, such a manipulation will be detected by the voter, since her result
would not fit with the result of other voters (A2). Another way to manipulate
9 Note, that these assumptions are common within e-voting systems, e.g. Helios [1].
the tally would be to replace the ballots during the shuffling or to produce an
incorrect decryption result. Both possibilities are prevented by the soundness of
the zero knowledge proofs of shuffle validity and decryption validity (A5).
We now consider the integrity of delegated votes. Note, in case the voter has
delegated her vote to multiple proxies, only a vote from one of them is included
into the tallying. Hence, in this way excluding the votes of other proxies from
being included in the tallying is not considered a violation of delegation integrity
for proxies. Similarly, excluding the votes cast on behalf of dishonest voters does
not violate the requirement.
A dishonest majority of present voters might prevent the delegated ballot
on behalf of the particular voter from being included in the tally by refusing to
publish their values e
(d)
i,j and preventing the reconstruction of e
(d)
i . While this is
prevented by the assumption that more than half of all the present voters are
honest (A5), we still do not consider it to be a violation of vote integrity, since
the misbehaviour of dishonest voters would be detected.
On the other hand, publishing the invalid values e
(d)
i,j , so that the recon-
structed e
(d)
i does not encrypt the value of g
mi
i for a valid delegation token mi,
would indeed be a violation of vote integrity, if undetected. However, the sound-
ness of zero-knowledge proof χi,j that accompanies ê
(d)
i,j and the computational
binding property of the commitment ci,j (A5) that holds unless the secret xi
is leaked (A2) ensure, that each e
(d)
i,j encrypts the value g
mi,j
i contained in ci,j .
Since ci,j is signed by the voter (and a lack of a valid signature would be notice-
able to the honest present voters, as well as to the delegating voters who verify
the election data), the unforgeability of the signature (A5) ensures that ci,j was
sent by the voter herself, hence, it contains the valid value of g
mi,j
i . Hence, the
reconstructed value e
(d)
i encrypts the same g
mi
i that is shared by the voter idi.
Another way to prevent the delegated votes from an honest proxy to be




i ) outputs some
value other than 1. This is prevented due to the soundness of the zero-knowledge
proofs accompanying the PETs. Furthermore, analogously to the case of direct
ballots, the soundness of zero knowledge proofs regarding shuffle validity and
decryption validity prevent the manipulation of cast ballots (A5).
Robustness. Violating robustness would mean, that either the mixing, the weed-
ing of invalid delegations or the decryption has failed to output a valid output.
This is prevented if at least t present voters are available and provide the required
output during the tallying (A3).
Vote privacy. This requirement is violated if the adversary corrupts voting
devices, which then leak the choices made by the voters. This is prevented as
long as the honest voters’ devices are not compromised (A2). Furthermore, the
voters themselves do not leak the randomness used by encrypting the vote (A2).
Another way to violate vote privacy of honest voters is to decrypt the en-
crypted votes prior to their anonymization (i.e. before mixing). This, however,
requires breaking the encryption of the votes (A5), or obtaining at least t shares
of a private election key from the present voters (A1,A2).
Furthermore, vote privacy can be violated by revealing the secret permutation
used by each voter during the mixing. However, as long as at least one voter keeps
this permutation secret (A1), the permutation between the resulting output and
the input ciphertexts remains secret as well.
Fairness. As the cast ballots are attached to the voter’s identities until the tal-
lying, violating fairness would also imply violating vote privacy. Hence, fairness
is ensured under the same assumptions as vote privacy: namely, that the voting
devices of honest voters are trustworthy (A2), at least Np − t+ 1 of Np present
voters are honest (A1), and the underlying encryption cannot be broken (A5).
We further evaluate the security requirements related to delegated voting.
Delegation eligibility. Casting a delegated ballot on behalf of a non-eligible voter
would require forging the signatures on the commitments ci,j sent to the present
voters (prevented by the assumptions (A4) and (A5)). Furthermore, multiple
delegated ballots on behalf of the same voter are dismissed during tallying.
Delegation integrity. One way to violate this requirement would be to cast
delegated votes on behalf of non-eligible voters. Given the fact that delegations
are accompanied by signed values ci,j , this attack strategy is prevented unless
the underlying PKI is not trustworthy (A4). Furthermore, reusing old signatures
on ci,j would be prevented, since the election information and the timestamp are
incorporated in the signature.
Another way to violate this requirement for a proxy idj who wants to vote
on behalf of the voter idi without being authorised, is to find out the value
of mi, shared by idi to the present voters during the delegation. This would
require either corrupting the voting device of idi (A2) or eavesdropping on the
communication between idi and a proxy chosen by her (prevented due to private
communication channels, i.e. the trustworthiness of the PKI (A4)). Note that
even if the adversary succeeds in obtaining at least t shares of g
mi,j
i from the
present voters, she would still require to compute the discrete logarithm mi,j
(A5).
Alternatively, an adversary can attempt manipulating the computation of
e
(d)
i , so that it encrypts a plaintext g
m′i chosen by her. As shown in the evaluation
of vote integrity, however, the assumptions (A4, A5) ensure than e
(d)
i encrypts
the same value g
mi,j
i sent by the voter.
Finally, delegation integrity can be violated, if the proxy idj submits a value
ê
(d)
i,j which is accepted during the weeding of invalid delegations. The soundness
of the proof of knowledge of plaintext discrete logarithm πi,j ensures (A5), that
the proxy knows the discrete log mi of the plaintext g
mi
i encrypted in ê
(d)
i,j .
As shown above, the assumptions (A4) and (A5) ensure that the reconstructed
values e
(d)
i encrypt the delegation tokens submitted by the voters to their chosen
proxies. The soundness of the proof of shuffle ensures (A5), that the anonymized
encrypted delegation tokens e′
(d)
i encrypt the same values as e
(d)
i .
Delegation privacy. The delegation privacy requirement would be violated if it
is revealed which proxy possesses the value mi that was shared by the voter idi
among other present voters. This can be achieved either by corrupting the voting
device of idi that stores mi (A2), coercing the present voters into disclosing all
the shares mi,j with the adversary (A6), getting access to at least t shares of g
mi
i
(i.e. corrupting at least t present voters (A1), their voting devices (A2) or the
communication channels between the present and the delegated voters (A4)), or
decrypting e
(d)
i and the values of ê
(d)
i,j (i.e. either breaking encryption (A5) or
obtaining at least t shares of a secret key skv by corrupting at least t present
voters (A1) or their voting devices (A2)).
Furthermore, the delegating voter herself cannot construct a proof that she
delegated to a specific proxy, even if she provides all the shares g
mi,j
i and the value
of mi to the adversary. Namely, given that the voter knows the discrete logarithm
xi = loggi hi, she can provide fake values of g
mi,j
i , mi instead. As such, for every




i,j ) and every
value m′i,j 6= mi,j the voter can find r′i,j , u′i,j so that xiri,j +mi,j = xir′i,j +m′i,j

















can then fake the receipt by sending a random value m′i and a set of shares m
′
i,j





present voter who requests such a receipt. Given t as threshold and Np as the
total amount of present voters among which gmi is shared, the voter would have
to fake at least Np − t + 1 shares mi,j . Hence, as long as at least Np − t + 1
present voters are honest, and that the delegating voter knows the identities of
the honest present voters, the adversary would not be able to distinguish between
the fake values g
mi,j
i , mi that from the real ones.
Note, however, that in case one of the voters idj ∈ Vp (i.e. who received
delegations) is not available in the meeting, our scheme reveals the number of
delegating voters who either abstained (but still participated in the delegation by
issuing invalid delegation tokens m′i,j 6= mi to all the voters in Vp) or delegated
to idj . We do not consider such a case to be a violation of delegation privacy,
since, as shown above, the scheme does not reveals the identities of the voters
who either issued invalid delegation tokens or delegated to idj and does not
make it possible to tell whether a given voter issued a valid token to idj or not
(under the assumptions (A1, (A2), (A4), (A5), and (A6)). At the same time, in
order to reduce the information leakage in our scheme, we would suggest actively
encouraging that the voters in Vd who decide to abstain still participate in the
delegation phase of the election by issuing invalid delegation tokens m′i,j 6= mi
to all the voters in Vp. Furthermore, the voters in Vp can be encouraged to re-
delegate by forwarding their delegation token to another trusted present voter,
if they think they would not be able to participate in the meeting.
Delegation power privacy. Given Nd = N −Np delegating voters, each present
voter should posses Nd delegation tokens. Violating delegation power privacy
would mean estimating, possibly with the help of the proxy herself who tries
to prove her delegation power, how many of those tokens are valid. However,
given that the delegation privacy requirement is fulfilled, a proxy herself does
not know which ones of the delegation tokens she received are valid. Hence, under
the assumptions that at least Np−t+1 of the present voters are honest (A1), the
PKI is trustworthy (A4), the voting devices of the delegating voters and honest
proxies are trustworthy (A2), the voters do not collaborate with the proxy to
prove that they delegated their voting right to her (A6) and the encryption is
not broken (A5), delegation power privacy is ensured.
Note that as already mentioned in the evaluation of delegation privacy, if
a proxy idj ∈ Vp does not participate in the election, our scheme could reveal
the number of voters Nj who either delegated to idj or issued invalid delegation
tokens mi,j to all the proxies. However, since the scheme does not reveal, how
many voters out of Nj abstained, delegation power privacy is not violated, espe-
cially if the voters who want to abstain are encouraged to issue invalid delegation
tokens instead of not participating at all.
6 Related Work
A number of proposals considered decentralised elections, i.e. the boardroom vot-
ing setting. The first proposal was made in [9] using decryption mix net. Several
proposals focused on self-tallying approach, based upon self-dissolving commit-
ments [12–14, 16, 17, 27]. Other approaches to boardroom voting have extended
the decentralised tallying scheme proposed in [8] and partially implemented in
the Helios voting system [1]. The variant of this approach using homomorphic tal-
lying has been proposed in [25], and the variant using mix net and decentralised
PKI establishment has been proposed and implemented in [20]. A boardroom
voting system described and evaluated in [2] implements a boardroom voting
scheme that does not rely on cryptography.
Several schemes with delegated voting functionality have been proposed in
the literature. The proposal by Kulyk et al. [19] addresses coercion resistance
in delegated voting by extending the well-known coercion-resistant JCJ/Civitas
theme for electronic voting towards delegated voting. A further proposal in [18]
extends the Helios voting system with delegated voting functionality. Their ap-
proach, however, only allows to delegate after the election setup has been con-
ducted (i.e. after the election key has been generated) which is not suitable to
the boardroom voting setting that we consider in this work. Tchorbadjiiski [28]
introduces hash chains to compute “connected” credentials on the client side
to enable a transitive and revocable delegation process, and the proposal by
Zwattendorfer et al. [30] uses blind signatures to enable delegation privacy.
7 Conclusion
We proposed an electronic voting scheme that facilitates delegated voting in the
boardroom voting setting. The scheme enforces both general security require-
ments on electronic voting, such as vote privacy and integrity of the election,
and security requirements that are specifically tailored to the delegation process.
As such, the scheme ensures delegation privacy by hiding the link between the
voter and the identity of her chosen proxy, delegation integrity by ensuring that
a proxy can only cast a ballot on some voter’s behalf if authorised by the voter,
delegation eligibility to ensure that only the delegated ballots on behalf of the
eligible voters are included in the tally and delegation power privacy to ensure,
that the scheme does not reveal how many voters have delegated to a particular
proxy.
In the future, we plan to extend our security evaluation and provide for-
mal security proofs for the proposed delegated boardroom voting scheme. For
this, the formal definitions for security requirements specific to delegated voting
should be established.
Another direction of future work would be to address the attack vectors on
vote secrecy, delegation privacy and delegation power privacy that exploit the
information revealed by the election result. Due to the relatively small num-
ber of voters in boardroom voting, these attacks might have more impact than
they have in large scale elections. Hence, we plan to consider ways to minimize
information revealed by the result during the course of the delegation.
Finally, a direction of future work would be focusing on the efficiency of
the scheme. While the scheme is designed for small-scale elections , it nonethe-
less requires a relatively high level of interaction among the present voters (the
bottleneck being the weeding of invalid delegated ballots during the tallying).
Therefore, methods for improving the efficiency by reducing the required com-
munications and computations are required.
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